BLINDAGEM RUSSA E OS INVULNERÁVEIS MBT's OCIDENTAIS

 

Artigos selecionados por  Marcel R. Castro

 

 Fontes

http://armor.kiev.ua/fofanov/  

www.defesanet.com.br

 

 

T-72: Será que é tão velho?

 

 

 

 

 

Kontakt-5 ERA

Kontakt-5 turret array

The Kontakt-5 EDZ is the explosive reactive armour (ERA) currently installed on Russian MBTs. It is often referred to as 2nd generation, heavy-duty, or integral ERA.

Where the conventional ERAs are only capable of defeating shaped-charge jets, Kontakt-5 can also defeat APFSDS rounds. Because of Kontakt-5, long-rod penetrators can lose over 30% of their penetration potential and the protected vehicle becomes immune to them.

This type of ERA can be easily recognized as it gives the vehicle outfitted with it a distinct 'clam-shell' appearance.

It is believed that while protected by Kontakt-5 ERA, Russian MBTs cannot be penetrated across the frontal arc by the M256 guns firing M829A1 APFSDS ammo.

In addition, thanks to their heavier (15 mm hard steel) front plate, the Kontakt-5 elements are harder to trigger by the precursor charges of tandem warheads, forcing the producers of tandem ATGMs to allocate more mass to precursor charge and, making an MBT more resistant to tandem HEAT warheads, as well.

It is very important to note that while light ERA containers are completely destroyed in the process of detonation, Kontakt-5 sections are not, as their detonation is contained by the outside armor plates. Therefore even after detonation Kontakt-5 sections continue to provide some applique protection.

This armor package is developed by NII Stali (Research Institute of Steel), the leading Russian developer of applique protection packages; Russian Federation pat. No 2064154 from 27.05.92.

Specifications:

 

Package mass:      3 t

 

Added protection, RHA rating (as stated by NII Stali):

vs APFSDS:            250 mm

vs HEAT:                600 mm

For those who wish to know more about the principles of reactive armour operation, and about Kontakt-5 in particular, here is an excellent article about ERAs by Robb McLeod.

 

. Anatomy of Light ERA

The first impetus to develop 'energetic' armours began in the 1960s after the expensive glass and ceramic armours proved defficient. The goal of such research was essentially to use the controlled release of energy to somehow destroy a forming HEAT jet. Logically, most of these ideas utilized the compact chemical energy stored in explosives to push some sort of metal plate into the incoming jet. One early idea incorporated the idea of using explosive 'pills' which were a metal plate backed by a thick layer of explosive. This explosive was confined or tamped by metal sidewalls, thus forming a metal pillbox over the explosive. This setup was then stuck on the surface of a tank and was detonated when the HEAT jet penetrated the cover plate, driving the plate into the jet. This idea was later abandoned by Rafael because the design proved unfeasible due to the large amount of explosive necessary to effect any damage against the jet.

Around 1969, a Norwegian working for Rafael by the name of Dr. Manfred Held discovered the drive-plate explosive sandwich design which later became explosive reactive armour. In this design two rectangular metal plates, referred to as the reactive or dynamic elements, sandwich an interlayer of high explosive. This 'box' is set at high obliquity to the anticipated angle of attack by the HEAT jet, usually 60°. When the jet penetrates the outer plate, the explosive is detonated by the pressures involved and the plates are rapidly forced apart; the acceleration is completed in around 6 us. The orientation of the plates to the explosive detonation front accelerates the front plate upwards in the x-y plane and slightly forwards and conversely forces the rear plate downward and slightly backward. The front plate is moving upward through the path of the jet and it exerts a destabilizing force on it, i.e. there are elastic longitudual waves travelling down the length of the jet. The destabilized jet, i.e. undergoing wave motion, then reaches the rear plate, which is moving in the opposite direction to the original plate. The force exerted by the rear plate is essentially a torque when taken with that of the front plate, and this causes the already destabilized jet to break up into many smaller pieces. These smaller pieces exhibit self-destructive behavoir - namely yaw (the equivalent of the high velocity impact belly-flop) and transverse velocity, which causes them to strike seperate areas of the target's armour.

So what are all the destructive effects visited on HEAT jets by ERA? The largest and most obvious result is the break-up of the jet and rotation of its pieces. There are, however, also some secondary effects that should be kept in mind. The first secondary effect on the jet is mass loss. Essentially, the jet must penetrate (or, in reality, perforate) the ERA plates. While in 'light' ERA these plates are relatively thin, the transverse motion of the plates means that the jet must actually generate a 'slot' rather than a 'hole' in the plates. So if the jet must travel through a 3 mm plate set at 60° with an apparent height of 15 mm, the total amount of armour that must be penetrated is twice that (two plates) or 80 mm. However, since in reality the jet is perforating the plates rather than undergoing radial displacement penetration, this is really more equivalent to 60 mm. Still, it is an important factor. Another important factor is the damaging of the tip of the HEAT jet. The tip of a HEAT jet can be moving in excess of 8 000 m/s, while the outer edges may be closer to 3 000 m/s. The tip of a HEAT jet also acheives initial penetration of the target material, and initiates adiabatic phase penetration (target metal flow). Essentially, the tip of a HEAT jet is the most efficient part of the jet, and it allows the rest of the jet to efficiently pile into the hole it generated and force the armour material out of its path. Removing jet head will reduce the penetration of the jet by 30% or more, even though it is a relatively small part of the jet's mass.

These two secondary effects are actually pretty substantial, contributing as much as 50% to the effect of ERA. Part of the reason for this is that jet breakup - the primary defeat mechanism - is a pretty common phenomena. A HEAT jet is a piece of metal undergoing extremely rapid severe plastic destortion, so any tiny defect in the construction of the cone will be magnified by the enormous forces involved, resulting in critical failure of the material during the formation of the HEAT jet, and hence, some (limited) break-up. It wasn't actually until the late 1970s that we were able to design well constructed cones which would produce a continious jet.

This first generation light ERA generates about 350 - 400 mm RHA worth of protection against large calibre warheads for the vehicle equipped with it. This implies an efficiency multiplier of about 20, which is incredibly high. However, ERA is not some magical shield. It will not completely stop the HEAT jet from a RPG - a backing layer of armour is still necessary to absorb the remains of the HEAT jet.

2. Light ERAs Deployment History

Around 1978 concurrent with the deployment of the M111 'Hetz' APFSDS round, an ERA package called 'Blazer' was produced for the Israeli Defence Force's Mag'lach (M60A1 & M48A3) and Sho't (Centurion) tanks. Later, versions were also produced for Ti-67S (retrofitted T-55) tanks. The package for the Mag'lach massed about 1 000 kg and the package for Sho't massed about 850 kg.

The Israeli application of ERA was rather crude, using large blocks which left large null zones in the armour after detonation. However, it still proved to be quite a marvelous applique during Israel's invasion of Lebannon in 1982.

After the demonstration of ERA in Lebannon, Russian planners deployed their own Kontakt EDZ armour starting with the T-80BV in 1983. Kontakt EDZ was not a copy of Israeli Blazer ERA. Kontakt was developed by the Soviets cocurrently with Rafael's developments, but was not initially fielded because of concerns over safety. This was in 1978. The abbreviation EDZ stands for "Elementy Dinamicheskoi Zashity", this translates into something like "dynamic protection elements". Two types of Kontakt blocks exist, the standard 'brick' as well as the 'wedge' which has only a single fixed reactive element. The wedge is used to cover null zones and it partly relies on the overlap of its neigbouring bricks for its effectiveness. By about 1985 all Soviet model tanks in Grouping Soviet Forces Germany had EDZ packages.

The T-80BV usually carried a 210 - 222 block array of Kontakt EDZ which was layered over the turret front and side, as well as the top. The hull was covered over the glacis and two thirds of the way down the sides. The T-64BV, the other tank in service with GsfG at the time, only carried a 115 block array of charges which provided mainly frontal protection. After front-line forces had been equiped with EDZ, T-72A and T-72B tanks, and later T-62M and T-55AM1 tanks began to receive ERA packages. Unlike the T-64B and T-80B tanks, which usually have the suffix 'V' (vzryvnoi - explosive) added to indicate EDZ such as T-64BV, the T-72 when fitted with EDZ is usually not distinguished in this fashion.

Kontakt EDZ was more advanced than Blazer ERA in a couple respects. Firstly, the blocks are on the order of 40% the size of Blazer blocks, which is considerably more demanding in terms of technology of the explosive interlayer. This also means that the amount of underlying armour exposed after a detonation is less. Secondly, Kontakt is a little more clever in its configuration. The brick is assymetric in its explosive interlayer, meaning that one end is thicker than the other. This induces rotation in the plates as well as separation, and as a result the armour is effective against HEAT jets at a wider variety of angles.

3. Kontakt-5 Heavy ERA

The development of Kontakt EDZ logically led to the development of a later version, called Kontakt-5, which was optimized to be effective not only against HEAT jets, but also APFSDS long rods. It was first deployed around 1985 on the first T-80Us. It is claimed that Kontakt-5 provides about 300 mm RHA equivalent of additional protection against APFSDS rounds, which corresponds to an increase of about 160% over the base armour of the T-80U (~720 mm total).

We've done a lot of work to analyze how effective Kontakt-5 is and by what methods it defeats the incoming APFSDS rounds. The results of the analysis are quite impressive in their own rough and limited way. We assumed that the Kontakt-5 brick was 10.5 cm wide by 23.0 cm long by 7.0 cm thick, with a mass of 10.35 kg. We arrived at a total mass of 2.8 t for the array. We later found out from Steven Zagola's literature that the array is supposed to be around three tonnes, so we were pretty happy. Assuming the use of Semtex for the interlayer, I found that the configuration was most likely a 15 mm plate up front, backed by 35 mm of explosive, and then a 20 mm plate. This assymetrical configuration had improved effectiveness because the APFSDS rod could still 'catch' the retreating rear plate while the front plate would retain a charateristic high velocity. This is completely opposite to the model that the US Army used in the late 1980s to discribe 'heavy' ERA. In their model, the front plate was on the order of 60 mm thick and the rear a standard 5 mm plate. They thought that the thick plate simply moved up into the path of the incoming long rod and forced it to make a 'slot' (thickness x height) rather than a hole (thickness). This is bogus; the front plate would tamp the explosive and would be barely set in motion.

Anyway, back to the point. Without getting into the actual math, after a couple of analyses, we arrived at our conclusion as to what defeat mechanisms were being imployed. These conclusions have not yet been conclusively proved and we hope to do that soon. We assumed that the massive areal density of the long rod perforated the thin plates with relative ease. Actual ablatic penetrator mass loss was set at about 2%. What we found was that we had these two plates, each individually with about 60% the momentum of the long rod penetrator, were moving oppositely up/down to each other, and that the path of the penetrator was such that it was moving between them. The forces exerted on the penetrator are apparently very large, so large in fact that they were in the region of plastic failure for most (read: all) metals. Essentially, when the penetrator touches the rear plate, the front plate guillotines off the first 5 - 6 cm of the rod. For a round such as the 120 mm M829A1 this represents a loss of about 8% of the total mass. More importantly, the nose is blunted. You would not believe how important that sharp point on the penetrator is. The difference in penetration between an equivalent hyper-sonic spike tipped penetrator and a blunt nose one is at least 20% (to a maximum of around 30%). This is mainly because a blunt nose is very inefficient in the initial phase of penetration before the ablatic shear phase can begin. The penetrator has to actually sharpen itself to the optimum Von Karam plastic wave theory shape for penetration of the target material before it can begin radially displacing the target material. This resolves itself in the form of a lot of wasted work and thus penetrator mass. The blunted penetrator also suffers structural damage and more mass loss as a shock wave travels down its length and blows spall off the tail. The main secondary effect of Kontakt-5 EDZ against APFSDS rounds is yaw induced by the front plate before contact with the rear plate is established. The total is about two to three degrees of yaw, which suddenly becomes a lot more in a denser material such as steel. Reduction in penetration due to a 2° yaw is about 6% and it grows exponentially worse from there, and on the 67° slope of the front glacis of the T-64/72/80/90, this is increased to about 15%.

Total loss in penetration amounts to about 2% + 8% + 22% + 6% = 38%, or in other words the penetrator is now only capable of penetrating 62% its original potential. Conversely we could say that the base armour is increased by the factor of the reciprocal of 62%, which is - surprise! - 161%.

So was I surprised by the results? Not really. I had expected penetrator yaw to be the primary defeat mechanism, but otherwise we had verified the effectiveness of Kontakt-5 before it became general public knowledge, which is great bragging rights.

Of course, now the goal is to do a rigorous mathematical proof.

Anyway,

APFSDS round is defeated by Kontakt-5

(X-ray photo)

Jane's International Defence Review 7/1997, pg. 15:

"IMPENETRABLE RUSSIAN TANK ARMOUR STANDS UP TO EXAMINATION

"Claims that the armour of Russian tanks is effectively impenetrable, made on the basis of test carried out in Germany (see IDR 7/1996, p.15), have been supported by comments made following tests in the US.

"Speaking at a conference on Future Armoured Warfare in London in May, IDR's Pentagon correspondent Leland Ness explained that US tests involved firing trials of Russian-built T-72 tanks fitted with Kontakt-5 explosive reactive armour (ERA). In contrast to the original, or 'light', type of ERA which is effective only against shaped charge jets, the 'heavy' Kontakt-5 ERA is also effective against the long-rod penetrators of APFSDS tank gun projectiles.

"When fitted to T-72 tanks, the 'heavy' ERA made them immune to the DU penetrators of M829 APFSDS, fired by the 120 mm guns of the US M1 Abrams tanks, which are among the most formidable of current tank gun projectiles.

"Richard M. Ogorkiewicz"

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Nota: Os russos também usam sistemas de defesa ativos desde 1997 (lição aprendida a duras penas  na primeira guerra da  Chechenia), que os ocidentais só vao COMEÇAR A INSTALAR EM 2012, e que desabilitam entre 40 e 70% dos tiros e  projéteis disparados contra eles.

 

 

 

ARENA Active Protection System

The Arena tank active protection system belongs to the latest generation of Russian APS, together with Drozd-2 APS.

Arena's direct predecessor was Shatjor APS that was installed on the experimental Obiekt 478M MBT. Both systems have been designed by the Kolomna-based Engineering Design Bureau (KBP) together with other allied enterprises.

Arena is intended to protect tanks from antitank grenades and ATGMs, including some variants of top-attack ATGMs.

The system is described in the Russian patent RU 2102678 C1

 

The system incorporates the following engineering solutions:

  • use of a multi-functional millimetre radar with "instant" scanning of all protected sector to detect and track antitank targets;
  • use of focused instant-effect protective ammunition for aimed destruction of incoming targets;
  • control equipment, represented by a specialized computer that provides automatic control over radar operation and system as a whole, as well as device for serviceability control of the system and its integrated parts and units.

Protective ammunition is housed in silo sections arranged around the turret. The rack-mounted radar is fixed on the turret roof. All other equipment is housed inside the turret. Connecting cables from the turret run inside the radar rack without affecting the sealing of the fighting compartment.

The system is switched on from the commander's control panel and then operates automatically. On completion of power-on self-test, the system switches to combat mode. All information on the modes of operation and serviceability of the system and its integrated units is displayed on the control panel.

Arena on a battlefield

In combat mode, the radar continuously searches for incoming projectiles. Once the threat is detected the radar switches to the target tracking mode, in which the data on the moving target is obtained and entered into the computer, which uses it to select the most appropriate silo and determine the time for its activation. At the determined moment, the computer generates command signals to the selected protective ammunition. The later is launched upwards and detonates, creating a directed stream of destructive elements which destroys any target within this field, eliminating the shaped-charge effect of the threat or reducing it to levels that are not dangerous to the tank.

In emergency the commander (operator) can manually operate and detonate protective ammunition from the control panel.

The number of unused protective ammunition is displayed on the control panel screen.

Each protective ammunition protects a certain azimuth sector, with destruction zones of adjacent ammunitions overlapping each other, thereby intercepting the targets repeatedly approaching the tank from the same direction. The number of mounted protective ammunition is expected to be usually sufficient to defeat all the threats to the tank during a single combat mission without replenishing the protective ammunition.

The system operates in any weather, round the clock, detects and engages targets under all conditions of tank combat employment, including while on the move with a turned turret.

The sector of the MBT protection in azimuth is enough to provide front, side and top protection. It moves together with the turret and overlaps the range of firing angles against tanks during their attack of the enemy's deep echeloned defensive positions.

The circuit-structural design of the radar and methods of radar data processing ensure the high immunity of the system to ECM.

The Arena system does not react to: targets at a range of over 50 meters from the tank; small-size targets (splinters, small caliber projectiles); targets flying away from the tank, including projectiles fired from its own gun; slow flying objects (pieces of earth, birds etc.); shells and projectiles exploding around the tank; projectiles flying over the tank, i.e. not crossing the protected projection of the tank.

All this resulted in radical reduction of false alerts and "unwanted" information entering the computer for analysis and processing and also allows operation only if a dangerous target appears within the system's zone of action and when this target is about to hit the tank.

Considerable attention was paid to the safety problem during the development of the system. There are several safety blocks in the APS launching circuits, which can be only released when the system equipment is in combat mode, the dangerous target is detected and there is a clear indication that this target is about to hit the tank.

There is no danger for the crew members when a protective ammunition operates. The level of pressure and impulse noise at the workstations does not exceed conventional norms when hatches are closed. The system does not operate when the hatches are open.

Owing to the small size of the dangerous zone (20-30 meters around the tank) the system is not hazardous to the accompanying infantry and external tank equipment and the system's units during operation of the protective ammunition. This is ensured by the selected layout and design of the protective ammunition, which forms no lethal splinters during exposition except directed flow of destructive elements that is ejected downwards. The system is also fitted with external warning lights that generate signals to infantry following the tank about the system's acivation.

The APS is protected against bullets and splinters and protective ammunition does not detonate in siloes when fired at by small caliber projectiles.

Provision is made for the complete electromagnetic compatibility of the tank protection system with other tank systems. The Arena system does not restrict the formation of tank groupings in terms of electromagnetic compatibility.

The equipment of tanks with protection systems can ensure their survivability on the battlefield during the offensive operations. In this case losses are reduced 1.5 - 1.7 times. It should be noted here that the Arena system intercepts the most dangerous targets for the tank (ATGMs and antitank grenades) that the tank cannot effectively handle. This occurs when ATGMs are launched from a range of 3-8 km, including ATGMs launched from helicopters and when concealed grenade launchers fire on the tank at short ranges and great variety of aspect angles.

The combat effectiveness of tanks equipped with protection systems can be dramatically increased if the other side is equipped only with light antitank weapons, for example, in local conflicts and during peace-making operations.

Compared to ERA, APS advantages are: destruction of antitank weapons away from the tank's armor; capability to intercept targets with tandem warheads; capability to protect vulnerable spots of the tank (periscopes, joints etc.); more effective azimuth sector of protection with equal weight of protection system.

However, active protection should not be considered an alternative to all conventional types of protection; on the contrary, the problem of increasing tank protection should be solved via a reasonable hybrid of the passive (armor) protection, optronic counter-measures, ERA and active protection. In this case, the tank developer should determine the optimal ratio of such a hybrid to ensure the required level of tank protection, based on "efficiency-cost" criteria.

Testbed MBT outfitted with ARENA

Specifications:

Package mass:

1100 kg

Reaction time:

0.07 sec

Engagement rate:

0.2 .. 0.4 sec/threat

Threat speed range:

70 .. 700 m/sec

Awareness range:

50 m

Protected angle:

±110°

Energy consumption:

1kW

Operating power:

27V

Number of protective elements:

22-26

 

                    

ARENA radar rack

ARENA ammo cassette

The damage inflicted by Arena splinter stream on the casing of a Maljutka-2 ATGM

Arena operation

 

 

 

 DROZD (Thrush) Active Protection System

The 1030M Drozd APS uses small rockets placed in fixed silos to both sides of the turret to defeat incoming ATGMs. The millimeter radar on the rear of a turret tracks the missile and fires the rocket from a silo that points in that direction. The rocket detonates, producing the stream of fragments that destroys the incoming projectile.

The system was installed on marine units' T-55 tanks (designated T-55AD, D signifying Drozd) in 1983.

This system had substantially less capability than the Arena APS in range of protected angles, number of incoming projectiles, and reliability of interception.

The Drozd-2 system that is being marketed today as an upgrade option for T-80U MBT offers several significant improvements over the original version, the most important being the drastically increased range of protected angles, as well as decreased projectile size and increased number of projectiles. This new system may be not inferior to Arena APS.

 

Specifications:

Designation                  Drozd          Drozd-2

                                 1030M

 

Layout on each side of the turret          

                                    2 blocks of 5 spread

                                    2 rockets

Protected angle               ±40°           ±120°

 

Number of rockets           8              10

Rocket designation          3UOF14

Rocket caliber                107mm

 

Engagement rate            0.35 sec/threat

Threat speed range         70 .. 700 m/sec

Reload time                   15 min

 

 


 

TShU-1-7 Shtora-1 EOCMDAS


(courtesy of Steven Zaloga and TANKOMASTER)

The Shtora-1 EOCMDAS (electro-optical counter-measures defensive aids suite) is one of the several unique features of Russian MBTs that distinguish them from the rest of the world. It was developed by VNII Transmash in St.Petersburg in cooperation with Elers-Elektron in Moscow, and introduced somewhere around 1988. This system effectively protects an MBT against the two most common ATGW types: wire-guided SACLOS systems (e.g. TOW, HOT) and laser-guided ATGMs (e.g. Hellfire, Copperhead).

Shtora-1 consists of a specialized computer/control panel, two electro-optical interference emitters located on each side of the gun, four laser sensors located on top of the turret, and racks of dedicated anti-laser smoke grenades.

The Shtora has two combat roles. In the first role, it works against IR guided ATGMs, by aligning the turret front to the incoming ATGM and using IR emitters to send false signals which scramble the ATGM guidance system. The principle involved is the following.

Wire-guided missiles such as the American TOW are guided to the target by means of a wire and a flare on the back of the missile. The flare is used to keep a 'reference point' of the missile in relationship to the target lock held by the operator, and the guidance computer tries to put the flare on the reference point. Shtora emitters create a large hotspot, essentially tricking the missile guidance into following the Shtora hotspot instead of the flare hotspot, resulting in faulty course corrections by the ATGW computer. In fact, the computer shall usually believe that no horisontal course correction is necessary since the false flare comes from the same direction as the targeted tank, while vertical corrections shall cause ATGM to either dive into the ground or climb into the sky, depending on whether the operator holds the lock below or above the emitters.

The second part of the system defeats laser guided weapons. When a laser beam is detected the Shtora informs the crew with light and sound; it then launches laser defeating smoke grenades, which enshroud the tank and break or degrade the lock. The tank commander can also press a button that will turn the turret front to the laser to meet incoming ATGM with the best protected section and to engage the laser beam source with the maingun.


T-90 turret layout showing
Shtora-1 EOCMDAS

Specifications:

System weight:         350 kg

 

Laser illumination sensors

Quantity:              2x TShU-1-11 precision sensors

                            2x TShU-1    rough sensors

Field of view (each):  -5° .. +25° elevation

                            90° azimuth

Field of view (total): 360° azimuth

 

EO interference emitters

Quantity:                   2, OTShU-1-7

Operating band:        0.7 .. 2.7 mkm

Protected sector:      4° elevation

                                 20° azimuth

Energy consumption:    1 kW

Light intensity:         20 mcad

 

Anti-FLIR smoke grenades

Quantity:                   12, 81 mm  3D17

Obscured band:         0.4 .. 14 mkm

Bloom time:               3 sec

Cloud persistence:     20 sec


 

 

Tabelas comparativas

 

1- Poder de penetração

Calibre

Munição

Penetrador

País

Penetração(1) em RHAe(2)

105 mm

Type 95

Urânio exaurido

China

580 mm

105 mm

T-2 HP

Tungstênio

Inglaterra

560 mm

105 mm

OFL105F2

Urânio exaurido

França

520 mm

105 mm

M-900

Urânio exaurido

EUA

520 mm

105 mm

DM-63

Tungstênio

Alemanha

450 mm

105 mm

M-426

Tungstênio

Israel

450 mm

120 mm

L-28

Urânio exaurido

Inglaterra

770 mm

120 mm

M-829 A3

Urânio exaurido

EUA

765 mm

120 mm

DM-53

Tungstênio

Alemanha

730 mm

 

(1) = Com relação ao item penetração, considerar o seguinte:

a) As munições 105 mm disparadas por canhão da família L7 e as de 120 mm por canhão L44; e
b) Os alvos colocados à distância de 2.000 m.

(2) = RHAe (Rolled Homogeneous Armor Equivalent). Explicação: Rolled Homogeneous Armor (RHA) é uma forma de se produzir uma blindagem de material homogêneo que garanta uniformidade e aumente a resistência à penetração. Rolled Homogeneous Armor Equivalent (RHAe) é uma medida criada para determinar a resistência de uma blindagem composta à penetração, comparando esta blindagem composta com uma blindagem otimizada em material uniforme (RHA). Por exemplo: um T-64A tem uma blindagem frontal da torre composta por 150 mm de aço, 150 mm de alumínio e 40 mm de aço prensados na forma de um “sanduíche”. Estes 340 mm de blindagem composta dão uma proteção contra munição de energia cinética (APFSDS) equivalente a 440 mm de blindagem homogênea (RHA). Contra munição  de energia química, do tipo explosiva de carga oca (HEAT), a proteção equivale a 550 mm de blindagem homogênea (RHA).

 

2- A Blindagem dos MBT’s Sulamericanos

Carro de Combate

País

Porção frontal da torre

Porção frontal superior do chassi

EC(1)

EQ(2)

EC(1)

EQ(2)

Leopard 2A4

Chile

690 mm

1290 mm

600 mm

710 mm

Leopard 1A5

Brasil

470 mm

450 mm

140 mm

140 mm

Leopard 1V

Chile

250 mm

480 mm

140 mm

140 mm

Leopard 1A1

Brasil

250 mm

480 mm

140 mm

140 mm

M-60 A3 TTS

Brasil

240 mm

260 mm

250 mm

275 mm

AMX-30 B2

Chile

260 mm

450 mm

240 mm

265 mm

AMX-30 EM2

Colômbia

230 mm

380 mm

240 mm

260 mm

AMX-30 V

Venezuela

230 mm

380 mm

240 mm

260 mm

Ti-67 (T-55)

Uruguai

230 mm

230 mm

190 mm

190 mm

T-55 AM2 (BDD)

Peru

520 mm

480 mm

330 mm

420 mm

(1)   = proteção contra munição de Energia Cinética (APFSDS)

(2)   = proteção contra munição de Energia Química, do tipo explosiva de carga oca (HEAT)

 

3- A Blindagem dos MBT’s Europeus, Americanos, Chineses

Carro de Combate

País

Porção frontal da torre

Porção frontal superior do chassi

EC(1)

EQ(2)

EC(1)

EQ(2)

Leopard 2A6

Alemanha

940 mm

1960 mm

620 mm

800 mm

M-1 A1

EUA

450 mm

800 mm

490 mm

800 mm

M-1 A2

EUA

900 mm

1620 mm

590 mm

1050 mm

M-1 A2 SEP

EUA

960 mm

1620 mm

590 mm

1050 mm

Challenger 2

Inglaterra

960 mm

1700 mm

660 mm

1000 mm

T-80 U

Rússia

850 mm

1450 mm

780 mm

1080 mm

T-90

Rússia

920 mm

1340 mm

710 mm

1070 mm

Merkava 4

Israel

1030 mm

1340 mm

760 mm

1380 mm

Leclerc

França

800 mm

1750 mm

600 mm

1060 mm

Type 99

China

800 mm

1050 mm

630 mm

860 mm

(1)   = proteção contra munição de Energia Cinética (APFSDS)

(2)   = proteção contra munição de Energia Química, do tipo explosiva de carga oca (HEAT)

 

 

 

 

AS IMAGENS DOS INVULNERÁVEIS MBT’S OCIDENTAIS

As fotos circulam pela internet. `

 

 Nota: Nos primeiros meses da primeira e depois da segunda  Guerra do Golfo mais de 80 MIA2 FORAM DESABILITADOS POR FORÇAS IRAQUIANAS...

 na verdade o numero é muito maior... do que o que eles divulgam.